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This paper describes a cognitively based human reliability analysis (HRA) quantification technique for
estimating the human error probabilities (HEPs) associated with operator and crew actions at nuclear power
plants. The method described here, Standardized Plant Analysis Risk-Human Reliability Analysis (SPAR-
H) method, was developed to aid in characterizing and quantifying human performance at nuclear power
plants. The intent was to develop a defensible method that would consider all factors that may influence
performance. In the SPAR-H approach, calculation of HEP rates is especially straightforward, starting with
pre-defined nominal error rates for cognitive vs. action-oriented tasks, and incorporating performance
shaping factor multipliers upon those nominal error rates.
INTRODUCTION
Human reliability analysis (HRA) assesses the safety and
risk significance of pre-initiator and post-initiator human
tasks performed at nuclear power plants (NPPs). The field
of HRA has been called to task because of the apparent
inability to tie HRA methods back to first principles in
human behavior (Gertman and Blackman, 1994). Generally,
HRA methods identify a set of factors believed to be related
to performance, focus on classes of human error or behavior,
and then manipulate those factors to arrive at a failure rate
estimate for use in probabilistic risk analysis (PRA). The
obvious problem with these approaches is completeness.
How do we know that the set of identified factors is, in fact,
complete? Moreover, are the factors flexible enough to
encompass a wide range of human behaviors? The most
sensible approach should begin with a comprehensive theory
of human behavior, to ensure that all relevant factors are
addressed and accounted for, and work to identify
demonstrated, underlying mechanisms that we know
influence and predict behavior.
The Standardized Plant Analysis Risk-Human Reliability
Analysis (SPAR-H) method (Blackman and Byers, 1995;
Byers et al., 1999; Gertman et al., 2005) was first released in
1995 as a simple-to-use approach for risk analysts to
compute human error probabilities (HEPs). One way in
which SPAR-H achieved simplicity was through the use of
performance shaping factors (PSFs). A PSF is an aspect of
the human’s individual characteristics, environment,
organization, or task that specifically decrements or
improves human performance, thus respectively increasing
or decreasing the likelihood of human error.
The cognitive and behavioral response model developed
for SPAR-H evolved out of a desire to acknowledge what
had been learned about human performance in early
cognitive science approaches and is generally considered an
information processing approach to human behavior. The
factors that comprise the basic elements of this model also
come from the literature surrounding the development and
testing of general information processing models of human
performance. A review of operating experience in NPPs and
a comparison of HRA methods revealed eight summary
PSFs that contributed to human performance in NPP
operation. These eight SPAR-H operational factors can be
directly associated with the model of human performance
and show the portion of the human information processing
model with which they are associated (see Figure 1).
Figure 1. SPAR-H Performance Shaping Factors in the
Information Processing Context.
ORIGINS OF THE SPAR-H METHOD
SPAR-H was originally called Accident Sequence
Precursor (ASP) HRA (Blackman and Byers, 1995), in
recognition of its use within the ASP program of the US
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). The method was
developed as a closely related alternative to two popular
approaches at the time. A Technique for Human Error Rate
Prediction (THERP; Swain and Guttman, 1983) had been
formally available as a method for over ten years. THERP
analyses required considerable training and topical mastery
to complete. Because of the difficulty in completing a
THERP analysis under strict time and resource constraints, a
simplified version of THERP was commissioned in 1987
and called the Accident Sequence Evaluation Program
Human Reliability Analysis Procedure (ASEP; Swain,
1987). While based on THERP, ASEP estimates diverged
from those in THERP. Moreover, the technique was often
emphasized as a screening HRA method, meaning its use
was primarily to provide rough estimates of error likelihood
for risk determination. This approach contrasted with the
nuanced results offered by THERP, offering in exchange a
significant time savings and greater simplicity in terms of
completing an analysis.
SPAR-H was born out of THERP and ASEP as a further
simplification and generalization of these two approaches.
Instead of mapping human activities to specific scenario
templates as in THERP and ASEP, SPAR-H utilized PSFs to
better generalize across the full spectrum of human
performance while maintaining common quantification
underpinnings. The original ASP HRA method was refined
in 1999 and adopted the name of the Standardized Plant
Analysis Risk (SPAR) PRA models developed in support of
the US NRC (Byers et al., 1999). This latter acronym,
SPAR HRA, more clearly delineated the method from
ASEP. The 2005 and most recent revision (Gertman et al.,
2005) adopted the acronym SPAR-H, whereby the H
signified that this method was connected specifically with
HRA vs. the broader PRA focus of the SPAR models.
TASK TYPES
Although it has a basis in human cognition and behavioral
research, SPAR-H strives to present a simple approach to
HEP estimation. Thus, in SPAR-H, quantification is based
upon the assignment of tasks to one of two types, diagnosis
or action. Examples of action tasks include operating
equipment, conducting calibration or testing, and other
activities performed during the course of following plant
procedures or work orders. Tasks that constitute
proceduralized actions are evaluated as action tasks.
Diagnosis tasks consist of cognitively engaging planning and
prioritizing activities, determining appropriate courses of
action, and using knowledge and experience to understand
existing conditions.
SPAR-H suggests that for cognitively engaging tasks such
as diagnosis, people tend to exhibit a nominal human error
rate equal to 0.01 (or 1E-2), excluding any adjustment for
PSFs or dependencies within a chain of events. For tasks
that are more action oriented, the nominal human error rate is
equal to about 0.001 (or 1E-3), excluding adjustments.
The nominal human error rate for diagnosis activities is
based on the value found in THERP Table 20-1, Item 4,
corresponding to the median HEP for a control room
diagnosis task within 30 minutes. This follows the so-called
30-minute rule in control room activity—a general rule for
how long operators should have available before they are
required to take action (IAEA, 1980). The nominal HEP for
action was derived from numerous representative action
tasks in THERP (see Table 20-7, Item 1; Table 20-9, Item 3;
Table 20-11, Items 1 and 2; Table 20-12, Item 3; and Table
20-13, Item 1).
PERFORMANCE SHAPING FACTORS
Whether the task type is determined to be diagnosis,
action, or some combination of the two, a PSF analysis is
performed and adjustments are made to calculate HEPs. This
section presents in order corresponding to the SPAR-H
worksheets, general definitions for the PSFs that constitute
part of the analysis process. Note that when an analyst
encounters a PSF for which there is inadequate information,
the nominal assignment is assumed. The following PSF
multiplier level assignments are applied to the nominal HEP
as appropriate for computing HEPs in NPPs that are at
power. Due to situational factors affecting human
performance, marginally different levels apply to NPPs that
are at low power or in shutdown modes. Note that the
derivation of the SPAR-H PSF multipliers from THERP is
documented in Boring and Blackman (2007).
Available Time
Available time refers to the amount of time that an
operator or a crew has to diagnose and act upon an abnormal
event. A shortage of time can affect the operator’s ability to
think clearly and consider alternatives. It may also affect the
operator’s ability to perform. Definitions differ somewhat,
depending on whether the activity is a diagnosis activity or
an action. The diagnosis values are provided below:
• Inadequate time—If the operator cannot diagnose the
problem in the amount of time available, no matter what
s/he does, then failure is certain. (Probability of failure =
1)
• Barely adequate time—2/3 the average time required to
diagnose the problem is available. (Multiplier = 10)
• Nominal time—on average, there is sufficient time to
diagnose the problem. (Multiplier = 1)
• Extra time—time available is between one to two times
greater than the nominal time required, and is also
greater than 30 minutes. (Multiplier = 0.1)
• Expansive time—time available is greater than two
times the nominal time required and is also greater than
a minimum time of 30 minutes; there is an inordinate
amount of time (a day or more) to diagnose the problem.
(Multiplier = 0.01)
Stress and Stressors
Stress (and level of arousal) have been broadly defined
and used to describe negative as well as positive motivating
forces of human performance. Stress as used in SPAR-H
refers to the level of undesirable conditions and
circumstances that impede the operator from easily
completing a task. Stress can include mental stress,
excessive workload, or physical stress (such as that imposed
by difficult environmental factors). It includes aspects of
narrowed attentional field or muscular tension, and can
include general apprehension or nervousness associated with
the importance of an event. Environmental factors often
referred to as stressors, such as excessive heat, noise, poor
ventilation, or radiation, can induce stress in a person and
affect the operator’s mental or physical performance. It is
important to note that the effect of stress on performance is
curvilinear—some small amount of stress can enhance
performance, and should be considered nominal, while high
and extreme levels of stress will negatively affect human
performance.
The assignment and definition of levels of stress or
stressors is identical across action and diagnosis and action
tasks:
• Extreme—a level of disruptive stress in which the
performance of most people will deteriorate drastically.
This is likely to occur when the onset of the stressor is
sudden and the stressing situation persists for long
periods. This level is also associated with the feeling of
threat to one’s physical well-being or to one’s self-
esteem or professional status, and is considered to be
qualitatively different from lesser degrees of high stress
(e.g., catastrophic failures can result in extreme stress
for operating personnel because of the potential for
radioactive release). (Multiplier = 5)
• High—a level of stress higher than the nominal level
(e.g., multiple instruments and annunciators alarm
unexpectedly and at the same time; loud, continuous
noise impacts ability to focus attention on the task; the
consequences of the task represent a threat to plant
safety). (Multiplier = 2)
• Nominal—the level of stress that is conducive to good
performance. (Multiplier = 1)
Complexity
Complexity refers to how difficult the task is to perform in
the given context. Complexity considers both the task and
the environment in which it is to be performed. The more
difficult the task is to perform, the greater the chance for
human error. Similarly, the more ambiguous the task is, the
greater the chance for human error. Complexity also
considers the mental effort required, such as performing
mental calculations, memory requirements, understanding
the underlying model of how the system works, and relying
on knowledge instead of training or practice. Complexity
can also refer to physical efforts required, such as physical
actions that are difficult because of complicated patterns of
movements.
In general, a task with greater complexity requires greater
skill and comprehension to complete successfully. Multiple
variables are usually involved in complex tasks. Concurrent
diagnosis of multiple events and execution of multiple
actions at the same time is more complex than diagnosing
and responding to single events. The multipliers are:
• Highly complex—very difficult to perform. There is
much ambiguity in what needs to be diagnosed or
executed. Many variables are involved, with concurrent
diagnoses or actions (i.e., unfamiliar maintenance task
requiring high skill). (Multiplier = 5)
• Moderately complex—somewhat difficult to perform.
There is some ambiguity in what needs to be diagnosed
or executed. Several variables are involved, perhaps
with some concurrent diagnoses or actions (i.e.,
evolution performed periodically with many steps).
(Multiplier = 2)
• Nominal—not difficult to perform. There is little
ambiguity in the diagnoses or actions. Single or few
variables are involved. (Multiplier = 1)
• Obvious diagnosis—diagnosis becomes greatly
simplified. There are times when a problem becomes so
obvious that it would be difficult for an operator to
misdiagnose it. (There is no obvious action PSF level
counterpart. Easy to perform actions are encompassed
in the nominal complexity rate.) (Multiplier = 0.1)
Experience and Training
This PSF refers to the experience and training of the
operator(s) involved in the task. Included in this
consideration are years of experience of the individual or
crew, and whether or not the operator/crew has been trained
on the type of accident, the amount of time passed since
training, and the systems involved in the task and scenario.
Another consideration is whether or not the scenario is novel
or unique (i.e., whether or not the crew or individual has
been involved in a similar scenario, in either a training or an
operational setting). Specific examples where training might
be deficient are guidance for bypassing engineered safety
functions, guidance for monitoring reactor conditions during
reactivity changes, and guidance for monitoring plant
operation during apparently normal, stable conditions for the
purpose of promoting the early detection of abnormalities.
The multipliers are as follows:
• Low—less than six months experience and/or training.
This level of experience/training does not provide the
level of knowledge and deep understanding required to
adequately perform the required tasks; does not provide
adequate practice in those tasks; or does not expose
individuals to various abnormal conditions. (Multiplier
= 10)
• Nominal—more than six months experience and/or
training. This level of experience/training provides an
adequate amount of formal schooling and instruction to
ensure that individuals are proficient in day-to-day
operations and have been exposed to abnormal
conditions. (Multiplier = 1)
• High—extensive experience; a demonstrated master.
This level of experience/training provides operators with
extensive knowledge and practice in a wide range of
potential scenarios. Good training makes operators well
prepared for possible situations. (Multiplier = 0.1)
Procedures
This PSF refers to the existence and use of formal
operating procedures for the tasks under consideration.
Common problems seen in event investigations for
procedures include situations where procedures give wrong
or inadequate information regarding a particular control
sequence. Another common problem is the ambiguity of
steps. PSF levels differ somewhat, depending on whether the
activity is a diagnosis activity or an action. In situations
where multiple transitions between procedures are required
to support a task or group of tasks, SPAR-H suggests that the
analyst adjust the PSF for complexity accordingly. If the
procedures themselves are problematic, i.e., inadequate,
then, the HRA analyst should assess the procedures and
determine whether they should be assigned an “inadequate”
or “poor” rating. The multipliers are as follows:
• Not available—the procedure needed for a particular
task or tasks in the event is not available. (Multiplier =
50)
• Incomplete—information is needed that is not contained
in the procedure or procedure sections; sections or task
instructions (or other needed information) are absent.
(Multiplier = 20)
• Available, but poor—a procedure is available but it is
difficult to use because of factors such as formatting
problems, ambiguity, or such a lack in consistency that
it impedes performance. (Multiplier = 5)
• Nominal—procedures are available and enhance
performance. (Multiplier = 1)
• Diagnostic/symptom oriented—diagnostic procedures
assist the operator/crew in correctly diagnosing the
event. Symptom-oriented procedures (sometimes called
function-oriented procedures) provide the means to
maintain critical safety functions. These procedures
allow operators to maintain the plant in a safe condition,
without the need to diagnose exactly what the event is,
and what needs to be done to mitigate the event. There
will be no catastrophic result (i.e., fuel damage) if
critical safety functions are maintained. Therefore, if
either diagnostic procedures (which assist in
determining probable cause) or symptom-oriented
procedures (which maintain critical safety functions) are
used, there is less probability that human error will lead
to a negative consequence. This being said, if the
symptom-based procedure is found to be inaccurate or
awkwardly constructed, then the procedures PSF should
be negatively rated. (Multiplier = 0.5; diagnosis only)
Ergonomics and Human Machine Interaction
Ergonomics refers to the equipment, displays and controls,
layout, quality, and quantity of information available from
instrumentation, and the interaction of the operator/crew
with the equipment to carry out tasks. Aspects of human
machine interaction are included in this category. The
adequacy or inadequacy of computer software is also
included in this PSF. Examples of poor ergonomics may be
found in panel design layout, annunciator designs, and
labeling. The PSF levels are:
• Missing/Misleading—the required instrumentation fails
to support diagnosis or post diagnosis behavior, or the
instrumentation is inaccurate (i.e., misleading).
Required information is not available from any source
(e.g., instrumentation is so unreliable that operators
ignore the instrument, even if it is registering correctly
at the time). (Multiplier = 50)
• Poor—the design of the plant negatively impacts task
performance (e.g., poor labeling, needed instrumentation
cannot be seen from a work station where control inputs
are made, or poor computer interfaces). (Multiplier =
20)
• Nominal—the design of the plant supports correct
performance, but does not enhance performance or
make tasks easier to carry out than typically expected
(e.g., operators are provided useful labels; the computer
interface is adequate and learnable, although not easy to
use). (Multiplier = 1)
• Good—the design of the plant positively impacts task
performance, providing needed information and the
ability to carry out tasks in such a way that lessens the
opportunities for error (e.g., easy to see, use, and
understand computer interfaces; instrumentation is
readable from workstation location, with measurements
provided in the appropriate units of measure).
(Multiplier = 0.5)
Fitness for Duty
Fitness for duty refers to whether or not the individual
performing the task is physically and mentally fit to perform
the task at the required time. Things that may affect fitness
include fatigue, sickness, drug use (legal or illegal),
overconfidence, personal problems, and distractions. Fitness
for duty includes factors associated with individuals, but not
related to training, experience, or stress. The levels are:
• Unfit—the individual is unable to carry out the required
tasks, due to illness or other physical or mental
incapacitation (e.g., having an incapacitating stroke).
(Probability of failure = 1)
• Degraded fitness—the individual is able to carry out the
tasks, although performance is negatively affected.
Mental and physical performance can be affected if an
individual is ill, such as having a fever. Individuals can
also exhibit degraded performance if they are
inappropriately overconfident in their abilities to
perform. Other examples of degraded fitness include
experiencing fatigue from long duty hours; taking cold
medicine that leaves the individual drowsy and nonalert;
or being distracted by personal bad news (such as news
of a terminal illness diagnosis of a loved one).
(Multiplier = 5)
• Nominal—the individual is able to carry out tasks; there
is no known performance degradation. (Multiplier = 1)
Work Processes
Work processes refer to aspects of doing work, including
inter-organizational, safety culture, work planning,
communication, and management support and policies. How
work is planned, communicated, and executed can affect
individual and crew performance. If planning and
communication are poor, then individuals may not fully
understand the work requirements. Work processes include
consideration of coordination, command, and control. Work
processes also include any management, organizational, or
supervisory factors that may affect performance. Examples
seen in event investigations are problems due to information
not being communicated during shift turnover, as well as
communication with maintenance crews and auxiliary
operators. Measures could include amount of rework, risk
worth of items in utility corrective action program backlog,
enforcement actions, turnover, performance efficiencies, etc.
The multipliers used in Work Processes include:
• Poor—performance is negatively affected by the work
processes at the plant (e.g., shift turnover does not
include adequate communication about ongoing
maintenance activities; poor command and control by
supervisor(s); performance expectations are not made
clear). (Multiplier = 2)
• Nominal—performance is not significantly affected by
work processes at the plant, or work processes do not
appear to play an important role (e.g., crew performance
is adequate; information is available, but not necessarily
proactively communicated). (Multiplier = 1)
• Good—work processes employed at the plant enhance
performance and lead to a more successful outcome than
would be the case if work processes were not well
implemented and supportive (e.g., good communication;
well-understood and supportive policies; cohesive
crew). (Multiplier = 0.8)
DISCUSSION
In an effort to characterize more completely those factors
influencing human performance, HRA methods have
proposed various numbers of PSFs. SPAR-H attempts to
provide reasonable coverage of the spectrum of human
performance influences in nuclear power plant operations
within the framework of the minimum reasonable number of
PSFs. The decision to use eight PSFs was based on a review
of cognitive activities suggested by a basic information
processing model and refined through field use. These PSFs
harmonize with more recent human performance
characterizations, including the Good Practices for
Implementing HRA (Kolaczkowski et al., 2005). Further, the
SPAR-H quantification values used for the PSFs were based
on available data within HRA, especially data provided in
the THERP method, thus bringing generalizing THERP to a
broader range of human activities.
The SPAR-H method provides a potent extension of
THERP that allows the analyst flexibility and
generalizability beyond narrowly defined tasks and
scenarios. This approach does not guarantee valid HEP
estimates. It does nonetheless provide a useful tool for
categorizing and quantifying human contributions to risk and
for facilitating risk-informed decision making.
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